From 15ffa43fafc8a2dfd1e69d8d6b05ef55a06ccfbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Landley Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2008 10:24:22 +0000 Subject: Make menuconfig help bigger and fluffier. --- extra/Configs/Config.in | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'extra/Configs') diff --git a/extra/Configs/Config.in b/extra/Configs/Config.in index a56292de8..4aca400b5 100644 --- a/extra/Configs/Config.in +++ b/extra/Configs/Config.in @@ -1062,24 +1062,29 @@ endif menu "String and Stdio Support" config UCLIBC_HAS_STRING_GENERIC_OPT - bool "Use glibc generic string functions" + bool "Use faster (but larger) generic string functions" default y help Answer Y to use the (tweaked) glibc generic string functions. + In general, they are faster (but 3-5K larger) than the base uClibc string functions which are optimized solely for size. Many people will answer Y. config UCLIBC_HAS_STRING_ARCH_OPT - bool "Use arch-specific string functions" + bool "Use arch-specific assembly string functions (where available)" default y help - Answer Y to use the arch-specific string functions instead of the - base uClibc versions, which are optimized exclusively for size. + Answer Y to use any archtecture-specific assembly language string + functions available for this target plaform. + + Note that assembly implementations are not available for all string + functions, so some generic (written in C) string functions may + still be used. - Most people will answer Y, as this has been default behavior - for some time. + These are small and fast, the only reason _not_ to say Y here is + for debugging purposes. config UCLIBC_HAS_CTYPE_TABLES bool "Use Table Versions Of 'ctype.h' Functions." @@ -1727,14 +1732,24 @@ config HAVE_NO_SSP default n config UCLIBC_HAS_SSP - bool "Support for propolice smashing stack protector" + bool "Support for GCC stack smashing protector" depends on !HAVE_NO_SSP default n help - Add propolice smashing stack protector to the library. - This requires GCC 4.1, supporting the -fstack-protector[-all] - options. GCC does not have to provide libssp, the needed - functions are added to ldso/libc instead. + Add code to support GCC's -fstack-protector[-all] option to uClibc. + This requires GCC 4.1 or newer. GCC does not have to provide libssp, + the needed functions are added to ldso/libc instead. + + GCC's stack protector is a reimplementation of IBM's propolice. + See http://www.trl.ibm.com/projects/security/ssp/ and + http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/hints/downloads/files/ssp.txt + for details. + + Note that NOEXECSTACK on a kernel with address space randomization + is generally sufficient to prevent most buffer overflow exploits + without increasing code size. This option essentially adds debugging + code to catch them. + Most people will answer N. config UCLIBC_HAS_SSP_COMPAT @@ -1743,12 +1758,15 @@ config UCLIBC_HAS_SSP_COMPAT default n help Add gcc-3.x propolice smashing stack protector to the library. + This requires a patched version of GCC, supporting the -fstack-protector[-all] options, with the __guard and __stack_smash_handler functions removed from libgcc. These functions are added to ldso/libc instead. + More information at: + Most people will answer N. config SSP_QUICK_CANARY @@ -1785,33 +1803,74 @@ config PROPOLICE_BLOCK_SEGV endchoice config UCLIBC_BUILD_SSP - bool "Build uClibc with propolice protection" + bool "Build uClibc with -fstack-protector" depends on UCLIBC_HAS_SSP default n help - Build all libraries and executables with propolice protection enabled. + Build all uClibc libraries and executables with -fstack-protector, + adding extra stack overflow checking to most uClibc functions. config UCLIBC_BUILD_RELRO - bool "Build uClibc with RELRO" + bool "Build uClibc with linker option -z RELRO" depends on HAVE_SHARED default y help - Build all libraries and executables with -z relro. + Build all libraries and executables with "ld -z relro". + + This tells the linker to mark chunks of an executable or shared + library read-only after applying dynamic relocations. (This comes + up when a global const variable is initialized to the address of a + function or the value of another global variable.) + + This is a fairly obscure option the ld man page doesn't even bother + to document properly. It's a security paranoia issue that's more + likely to consume memory (by allocating an extra page) rather than + save it. + + This is explained in more depth at + http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/189 + + Nobody is likely to care whether you say Y or N here. config UCLIBC_BUILD_NOW - bool "Build uClibc with NOW" + bool "Build uClibc with linker option -z NOW" depends on HAVE_SHARED default n help - Build all libraries and executables with -z now. + Build all libraries and executables with "ld -z now". + + This tells the linker to resolve all symbols when the library is + first loaded, rather than when each function is first called. This + increases start-up latency by a few microseconds and may do + unnecessary work (resolving symbols that are never used), but the + realtime people like it for making microbenchmark timings slightly + more predictable and in some cases it can be slightly faster due to + CPU cache behavior (not having to fault the linker back in to do + lazy symbol resolution). + + Most people can't tell the difference between selecting Y or N here. config UCLIBC_BUILD_NOEXECSTACK bool "Build uClibc with noexecstack marking" default y help - Mark all assembler files as noexecstack. This will result in marking - all libraries and executables built against uClibc not requiring - executable stack. + Mark all assembler files as noexecstack, which will mark uClibc + as not requiring an executable stack. (This doesn't prevent other + files you link against from claiming to need an executable stack, it + just won't cause uClibc to request it unnecessarily.) + + This is a security thing to make buffer overflows harder to exploit. + By itself, it's kind of useless, as Linus Torvalds explained in 1998: + http://old.lwn.net/1998/0806/a/linus-noexec.html + + It only actually provides any security when combined with address + space randomization, explained here: http://lwn.net/Articles/121845/ + + Address space randomization is on by default in current linux + kernels (although it can be disabled using the option + CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK). + + You should probably say Y. endmenu -- cgit v1.2.3